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AKZO AND THE DEBATE ON IN-HOUSE PRIVILEGE IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
Clinton R. Long* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Within the realm of rights and privileges that attorneys enjoy, 
attorney-client privilege is one of the most essential. Some have called 
this right a “time-honored sanctuary”1 and “common law’s oldest 
privilege.”2 Some say that legal privilege even dates back to the time of 
the Roman Empire.
3
 Indeed, just about “every article, case, and treatise 
on the attorney-client privilege begins with the observation that the 
attorney-client privilege is the oldest evidentiary privilege recognized in 
Anglo-American common law.”4 It is clear that attorneys take this 
privilege very seriously and seek its expansion while cringing at any 
limitations placed thereon. These advocates have had many reasons to 
cringe lately. Many are claiming that privilege is under attack in the 
United States.
5
 The doctrine is becoming more and more restricted by the 
federal government as the government faces increasingly complicated 
crises.
6
 Corporate scandals, terrorism, and a number of other issues 
challenge the U.S. government and many others abroad,
7
 which make it 
understandable that any evidentiary benefit a government can gain in an 
investigation will be welcomed. However, when this comes at the price 
of limiting the attorney-client privilege, compromise can be difficult to 
find between the competing interests of protecting the law and 
maintaining privacy in the attorney-client relationship. 
 This debate is not specific to attorneys and the government in the 
United States. A recent decision by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (ECJ) has enlivened a similar debate in the European Union (EU) 
regarding privilege in the corporate attorney setting. In its recently 
decided case, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd. v. Commission, the ECJ 
confirmed previous case law
8
 and affirmed the General Court’s decision 
in the immediate case by concluding that privilege does not exist for in-
                                                     
* LL.M. Candidate—Class of 2012, George Washington University Law School. 
1 Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Response to 
the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 897, 899 (2006).  
2 Stephen A. Calhoun, Note, Globalization's Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and What 
U.S. Courts Can Do to Prevent It, 87 TEX L. REV. 235, 265 (2008). 
3 See, e.g., Lieutenant Colonel Norman K. Thompson & Captain Joshua E. Kastenberg, The 
Attorney-Client Privilege: Practical Military Applications of a Professional Core Value, 49 A.F. L. 
REV. 1, 2–3 (2000) (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1070 (1978)). 
4 Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-Front Assault on the 
Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why it is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 474 (2003). 
5 See, e.g., id. 
6 See, e.g., id. at 471. 
7 See, e.g., id. 
8 Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. 1575.  
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house attorneys in relation to the EU and its investigations.
9
 Not 
surprisingly, in-house attorneys in Europe are not pleased with this 
decision, which renders communications that they have with employees 
of their corporations completely subject to the investigations of the 
European Commission (Commission). Competition attorneys, which 
were at the center of the Commission’s investigation in Akzo, are 
particularly impacted by this decision because of the frequency with 
which they can be subject to Commission investigations. However, this 
ruling affects all in-house attorneys by limiting the advice they can give 
and the quantity of written communication they can use without 
compromising the privacy of their clients’ information. 
 The critics have reason to be upset. Akzo appears to be outdated; the 
ECJ followed case law that was decided in 1982. This case was decided 
before the advent of e-mail and when the proliferation of in-house 
counsel was not nearly as great as it is now. Akzo not only appears to be 
outdated, it favors too heavily one policy argument over another. It is 
understandable that the EU wants to obtain incriminating evidence, 
especially in competition investigations when evidence might be hard to 
find. However, the Court favored this far more in Akzo than the ability of 
clients and their in-house attorneys to freely discuss legal issues. This 
ignores the crippling effect that withholding privilege could have on in-
house counsel.  
 In-house counsel should benefit from privilege at the EU level, as 
outside counsel already does. However, in order to find the proper 
balance of protecting the attorney-client relationship and the 
Commission’s ability to investigate potential competition or other legal 
issues, the Commission should also be able to acquire documents that 
display evidence of illegal behavior. A decision on what should be 
disclosed in an investigation should be left to an independent tribunal 
and not to either party in the investigation. This will balance the policy 
interests of both sides of the debate by giving in-house attorneys 
privilege, but also enabling the Commission to override the privilege 
when a privileged communication manifests illegality.  
 Before elaborating upon this policy suggestion, this article first 
presents a brief summary of the facts and procedural posture of Akzo. An 
analysis of whether the ECJ made the proper decision in Akzo follows. 
Next, a discussion of the key public policy arguments both in favor of 
and against extending privilege to in-house attorneys in the EU is 
presented. Finally, this article argues for extending privilege to in-house 
attorneys while also reserving the ability of the Commission and any 




                                                     
9 Case C-550/07, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. & Akcros Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 ECJ EUR-
Lex LEXIS 807 (Sept. 14, 2010). 
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II.  BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF 
AKZO 
 
 In early 2003, officials from the Commission visited the office of 
Akzo/Akcros in the United Kingdom to investigate potential violations 
of EU competition laws.
10
 During the investigation, the officials took 
copies of a large number of company documents.
11
 However, a dispute 
arose over a few of the documents and whether privilege extended to 
them.
12
 Akzo/Akcros said that the documents were privileged and thus 
not subject to review by the Commission, while the Commission said 
that they would examine the documents to determine if privilege would 
apply.
13
 The officials at Akzo/Akcros objected, and the Commission told 
them that this might constitute obstruction of a Commission 
investigation.
14
 The parties agreed that an Akzo/Akcros representative 
could watch while the Commission investigation’s leader determined 
whether the five documents at issue were privileged.
15
 
 The Commission deemed three of them definitely not protected by 
privilege; two of these were e-mails between Akcros’ general manager 
and a Dutch in-house attorney of Akzo’s who is a registered advocaat in 
the Netherlands.
16
 After the Commission took copies of these documents, 
Akzo/Akcros attempted, and failed, to persuade the Commission to 
reconsider its decision through a letter explaining why the documents 
were privileged.
17
 After another opportunity for Akzo/Akcros to prove 
that the documents were privileged, the Commission made a final 
decision that the documents were not privileged.
18
 The General Court 
agreed with the Commission when Akzo/Akcros challenged these 
Commission decisions. The main reason the General Court decided that 
privilege did not extend to the documents was because the ECJ requires 
that the attorney involved be independent of the client to receive 
privilege; in-house counsel does not qualify as independent.
19
  
 Akzo/Akcros appealed on three grounds. First, Akzo/Akcros argued 
that the General Court incorrectly interpreted the independence 
requirement of privilege, and this resulted in unequal treatment of in-
house counsel as compared to outside counsel.
20
 Instead of a “literal and 
partial interpretation” of AM & S Europe, which is what the parties claim 
the General Court used, the General Court should have used a 
                                                     
10 Case T-125/03, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. & Akcros Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-
03523, ¶ 2.  
11 Id.  
12 Id. ¶ 3. 
13 Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 
14 Id. ¶ 3. 
15 Id. ¶¶ 4–5. 
16 Id. ¶¶ 8–9. 
17 Id. ¶ 10. 
18 Id. ¶¶ 11, 14  
19 Id. ¶¶ 166–69. 
20 Case C-550/07, supra note 9, ¶ 30. 
WINTER 2011                       Akzo and the Debate on In-House Privilege 
4 
“teleological” interpretation.21 The appellants argued that two paragraphs 
from AM & S Europe actually show that “the Court of Justice does not 
equate the existence of an employment relationship with a lack of 
independence on the part of the lawyer.”22 Also, the appellants said that 
their attorney was independent: 
 
An in-house lawyer enrolled at a Bar or Law Society is, simply on 
account of his obligations of professional conduct and discipline, just 
as independent as an external lawyer. Furthermore, the guarantees of 
independence enjoyed by an ‘advocaat in dienstbetrekking’, that is 





 Second, the Akzo/Akcros argued that the ECJ decided AM & S 
Europe at a time when fewer countries recognized in-house counsel 
communication as privileged, and also that EU law has developed to the 
point where privilege should extend to in-house counsel 
communication.
24
 The General Court’s decision “lowers the level of 
protection of the rights of defence of undertakings” and makes advice far 
less valuable.
25
 Furthermore, the appellants argued that the General 
Court’s decision makes the law less certain because it provides a 
different standard for evidence and privilege than the standards that 
many member states have in their domestic competition investigations.
26
  
 Third, the appellants argued that the General Court’s judgment 
violates the “principle of national procedural autonomy and the principle 
of the conferred powers.”27 Privilege is an aspect of EU law that has not 
been fully harmonized across the different member states, which means 
that this procedural issue should be determined based on the member 
states’ rules.28 
 In response to Akzo/Akcros’s first item of appeal, the ECJ said that 
the General Court correctly interpreted AM & S Europe: it is clear “both 
from the in-house lawyer’s economic dependence and the close ties with 
his employer, that he does not enjoy a level of professional independence 
comparable to that of an external lawyer.”29 In-house and outside 
counsels have different levels of independence and are thus differently 
situated so that a claim of unequal treatment cannot be brought.
30
 Also, 
the ECJ said that membership in a national bar association, such as the 
                                                     
21 Id. ¶ 32. 
22 Id. ¶ 34. 
23 Id. ¶ 32. 
24 Id. ¶¶ 65–66. 
25 Id. ¶ 90. 
26 Id. ¶ 98. 
27 Id. ¶ 109. 
28 Id. ¶ 110. 
29 Id. ¶ 49. 
30 Id. ¶¶ 58–59. 
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Regarding the appellants’ second claim, the ECJ found no evidence of a 
change in general movement among the EU member states toward 
allowing privilege to in-house counsel.
32
 Furthermore, while there have 
been changes in EU competition law, none of those changes require that 
in-house counsel and outside attorneys be treated equally with regards to 
privilege.
33
 Also, the ECJ did not buy the arguments based on the rights 
of defense
34
 or the principle of certainty.
35
 
 The ECJ similarly treated the appellants’ third ground of appeal. The 
appellants argued that the EU did not have a rule on privilege, which 
meant that, under the principle of national procedural autonomy, each 
member state would decide the procedures.
36
 However, the ECJ said that 
enforcement of EU competition rules requires a uniform application of 
privilege doctrines.
37
 Member states’ laws and procedures do not apply 
unless they assist the Commission in the investigation. For these reasons, 
there is no basis to apply the principle of national procedural autonomy.
38
 
The appellants failed to convince the Court to side with any of their 
claims and the ECJ dismissed the case without any changes to the 
restriction on privilege for in-house counsel. 
III.     IS AKZO CORRECT? 
 This decision has met a great deal of opposition from the legal 
industry. Akzo is what some consider “an antiquated view of the in-house 
legal practice”39 and is puzzling for several reasons. Although the Akzo 
decision correctly follows precedent, it is important to analyze whether 
the precedent is correct. In AM & S Europe, the main precedent relied on 
in Akzo, the ECJ decided on a similar dispute over what documents the 
Commission could take in a competition law investigation. The ECJ 
looked at the relevant laws of member states on the issue and decided 
that the privilege of confidentiality afforded to written communication 
between an attorney and his or her client should be subject to two 
conditions: that “such communications are made for the purposes and in 
the interests of the client’s rights of defense and, on the other hand, they 
emanate from independent lawyers, that is to say, lawyers who are not 
bound to the client by a relationship of employment.”40 
                                                     
31 Id. ¶ 45. 
32 Id. ¶¶ 73–76. 
33 Id. ¶ 83. 
34 Id. ¶¶ 92–97. 
35 Id. ¶¶ 100–07. 
36 Id. ¶ 113. 
37 Id. ¶¶ 114–15. 
38 Id. ¶¶ 119–20. 
39 Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, ACC Says Akzo Decision in European Court Refusing to 
Recognize Legal Professional Privilege For In-house Counsel is Poor Policy (Sept. 14, 2010), 
http://www.acc.com/aboutacc/newsroom/pressreleases/Akzo-Decision-in-EJC-is-Poor-Policy.cfm. 
40 Case 155/79, supra note 8, ¶ 21. 
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 The policy implications of encouraging attorney independence are 
clear.
41
 However, the ECJ—both in AM & S Europe and Akzo—
advanced the idea that outside attorneys are independent and used little 
concrete evidence to support its position. While in-house attorneys are 
directly employed by their client, outside attorneys are also employed by 
the client. The main difference is that outside attorneys have multiple 
clients. However, it is hard to see how being an outside attorney makes 
him or her sufficiently independent so as to benefit from privilege. An 
outside attorney who has been a company’s main counsel for fifty years 
may be less independent than an in-house counsel who is one year 
removed from finishing his or her legal studies. One commentator stated 
that the ECJ “has locked into place the notion that in-house lawyers are 
not capable of independent judgment under EU professional standards.”42 
Furthermore, “the idea that professional independence stems from the 
type of office a lawyer works in, rather than from their moral and 
professional compass, evidences a deep misunderstanding of legal 
professionalism and lawyers.”43 It does not make sense to keep an 
artificial distinction that cannot be relied upon to determine whether or 
not a lawyer will act independently.  
 Despite the appellants’ claims that the legal situation in the EU has 
changed, the ECJ gave no consideration to how the world, the EU, and 
the law have evolved since 1982. The EU has evolved since 1982, when 
AM & S Europe was decided. There have been multiple EU treaties that 
have had a very significant impact on many areas of EU law, and the 
number of member states—ten in 1982—has now grown to twenty-
seven.  
 Perhaps the most significant of these changes over the past thirty 
years, however, is the advent of electronic communication. This alone 
should be a tremendous factor in support of reconsidering AM & S 
Europe. With an outdated law on communication that does not take into 
account the volume of electronic communication that exists today, the 
ECJ effectively removed the ability of in-house counsel to use e-mail, or 
other electronic communication for a great deal of purposes. The ECJ’s 
decision in Akzo seems dated in another sense: “The ECJ has not 
recognised that there has been any increase of importance of in-house 
lawyers nor their close involvement in competition compliance.”44 The 
ECJ correctly followed precedent; however, it seems that the Akzo 
decision is incorrect because it fails to take into account the myriad 
technological and political changes that have occurred since the early 
1980s.  
                                                     
41 In the United States these policy implications are embedded in the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2010) (“In representing a client, a 
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.”). 
42 Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, supra note 39. 
43 Id. 
44 ECJ Rules on Privilege for In-House Lawyers, REEDSMITH (Sept. 21, 2010), 
http://www.reedsmith.com/our_people.cfm?cit_id=28860&faArea1=customWidgets.content_view_
1&usecache=false.  
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IV.     POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF AKZO 
 There are a large number of additional policy arguments in favor of 
extending privilege to in-house counsel. For example, not extending 
privilege harms clients, attorneys, and may even hinder the Commission 
in its role of enforcing competition laws. The ECJ in Akzo failed to see 
the potential harm, believing instead that withholding privilege means 
more effective regulation of EU law. Finding the proper balance between 
allowing attorney-client privilege and Commission interests in effective 
regulation will better benefit both parties.  
 Withholding privilege from the in-house attorney-client relationship 
harms corporations in many ways. Without privilege, corporate clients 
are faced with an impossible dilemma. They either must not exchange 
any documents or e-mails with their in-house counsel, effectively 
ignoring efficiency enhancing tools essential in the twenty-first century, 
or they can choose to be put “at a disadvantage by forcing [themselves] 
to divulge confidential communications to the Commission, thus 
jeopardizing their standing in litigation matters, as well as day-to-day 
business.”45 Neither of these outcomes is desirable.  
 In addition, clients must be able to freely and openly discuss and 
explore all of their legal options with their in-house counsel without the 
fear of the Commission scouring the information for possible illegalities. 
Withholding privilege “weakens, from a competition law perspective, the 
relationship between in-house lawyers and their employers.”46 By 
granting privilege, the client would not be disadvantaged by using in-
house counsel. In no area of the law is this truer than in competition law, 
where attorneys give legal advice that will be relied upon to determine 
whether a proposed action is legal or illegal. 
 A potentially drastic effect of not extending privilege is that the 
corporate client can face liability in other jurisdictions based on what the 
Commission can discover. “Consequences are potentially far reaching, 
as, for example, with U.S. privilege law, where disclosure to the 
Commission could be seen to amount to voluntary disclosure resulting in 
a waiver of privilege in U.S. legal proceedings.”47 This could be 
disastrous for multinational companies that are subject to laws in both 
the EU and the U.S., especially companies dealing with competition 
investigations. Competition authorities are becoming increasingly 
aggressive as companies and industries are becoming increasingly global 
in nature. A number of authorities around the world would jump at 
                                                     
45 Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, supra note 39. 
46 Dechert LLP, Legal Privilege Rule: ECJ Affirms Akzo Nobel No Privilege for 
Communications with In-House Counsel in EU Investigations, DECHERTONPOINT, 3 (Sept. 2009), 
http://www.dechert.com/library/Antitrust_59_9-10_Legal_Privilege_Rule.pdf. 
47 Bryan Cave, The European Court Of Justice Dismisses Appeal For Legal Professional 
Privilege For In-House Lawyers, BRYAN CAVE BULLETINS, 2 (Sept. 17, 2010), 
http://bryancave.com/bulletins/list.aspx?Date=2010 (scroll down to the publication date; then follow 
“The European Court of Justice Dismisses Appeal For Legal Professional Privilege For In-House 
Lawyers” hyperlink).  
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information and communications waived mandatorily by companies in 
the EU. To prevent these disastrous results, the ECJ should allow in-
house attorneys the benefit of privilege. The EU should consider this 
possibility in its policy-making decisions by looking at the adverse 
impact that withholding privilege could bring to its citizens and 
companies in competition investigations abroad. 
 Furthermore, the withholding of privilege from in-house counsel 
harms companies by discouraging them from hiring or keeping in-house 
counsel. It is not desirable to encourage corporations to shy away from 
hiring in-house counsel because in-house counsel benefits both the 
corporation and the individual attorney and is both efficient and cost-
effective. Similarly, the legal profession will suffer if there are fewer 
jobs available in-house based on a fear of hiring attorneys because of 
lack of privilege.  
 Lack of privilege limits the effectiveness of in-house counsel. 
Because many companies will likely shy away from full disclosure to 
their in-house counsel, attorneys will not be able to fully advocate; 
information is vital to helping the attorney fully perform his or her 
duties.
48
 Furthermore, in-house attorneys often provide an “invaluable 
role in the daily work of their employers, in particular their intimate 
knowledge of the business, their ability to meet the needs of their 
employer for time-critical advice, and their need to be involved in 
internal compliance programs.”49 By encouraging attorneys to not work 
in-house or by discouraging full disclosure, attorneys will lose much of 
their niche. They might be able to use it in a law firm setting, but they 
also might not be able to as effectively or at all. With multiple clients, 
outside attorneys cannot give the same attention to the corporation as in-
house counsel. The resultant harm is that both the client and attorney lose 
the expertise provided by in-house counsel. In all areas of the law, 
including the competition setting, expertise on the laws and procedures is 
essential. Discouraging such expertise and focus afforded by in-house 
counsel is a bad policy result of Akzo. 
 In the aftermath of Akzo, one firm advises that in-house attorneys do 
the following: “Conduct company investigations orally; Resist preparing 
notes, minutes or files related to company investigations; Review 
electronic mail policies related to communications; Instruct external 
lawyers to provide advice in the context of defense.”50 Attorneys cannot 
do their job properly with these restrictions. It is not a good idea to 
discourage attorneys from taking notes or to limit their use of necessary 
means and devices to properly effectuate their duties. Without privilege, 
                                                     
48 See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). 
49 Jones Day, Antitrust Alert: European Court of Justice Upholds Judgment That EU Legal 
Professional Privilege Does Not Extend to In-house Lawyers, JONES DAY PUBLICATIONS (Sept. 
2010), http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert--european-court-of-justice-upholds-judgment-that-
eu-legal-professional-privilege-does-not-extend-to-in-house-lawyers-09-15-2010/. 
50 Robert Campbell & Kathleen Smith Ruhland, ECJ Decision in Akzo Nobel: Missed 
Opportunity to Extend In-House Privilege, FAEGRE & BENSON (Oct. 12, 2010), 
http://www.faegre.com/12144. 
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attorneys and the corporations they serve will feel required to adopt these 
types of poor business practices to protect the legitimate privacy interests 
of the company. If in-house attorneys had privilege, they would be able 
to effectively advocate through taking notes in meetings, sending e-
mails, and so forth. 
 Surprisingly, extending privilege could also benefit rather than 
hinder the Commission in its competition and other enforcement. Some 
argue that the ruling in Akzo could actually make it more difficult for the 
Commission to fulfill its responsibilities:  
 
The rigid position taken by the ECJ will also likely impede the 
regulatory compliance roles increasingly performed by experienced 
in-house counsel and shift the role in internal investigations to 
outside law firms who retain the benefits of legal privilege but who 
often lack a thorough knowledge of the business and the implications 




Reliance on the vital role that in-house counsels play in competition 
compliance will be reduced.
52
 Furthermore, shifting regulatory 
compliance to less-experienced outside law firms may result in more 
infringements of the law, while inhibiting the Commission’s ability to 
effectively investigate those infringements. Extending privilege to in-
house counsel would be an excellent way for the EU to promote the 
important, expert role that many in-house attorneys play.
53
 While 
extending privilege would restrict the amount of documents Commission 
investigators could view, the role of in-house counsel would prove more 
useful because they would help their companies comply with regulations 
and willingly participate in Commission investigations.  
 Although there are a number of strong arguments in favor of 
extending privilege, there is an important reason for not doing so: 
withholding privilege will likely discourage illegal behavior. For good 
reason, EU courts “want to ensure that deeply hidden facts in cases 
involving clandestine behavior are uncovered. The top European courts 
want to limit any exception to that rule, and to confine privilege to advice 
from external lawyers.”54 The Commission’s evidence gathering will be 
much easier if there are no privilege restrictions. More documents will be 
available and, with this evidence, the Commission’s role of enforcing 
competition laws will likely be more effective. This might have a strong 
deterrence effect on those who consider violating the competition and 
                                                     
51 Hugh F. Bangasser et. al, EU's Highest Court Refuses to Extend Privilege to 
Communications with In House Lawyers, K & L GATES (Sept. 17, 2010), 
http://www.klgates.com/eus-highest-court-refuses-to-extend-privilege-to-communications-with-in-
house-lawyers-09-17-2010/. 
52 ReedSmith, supra note 44.  
53 Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, supra note 39. 
54 John Spano, No In-House Counsel Privilege in Europe — EU High Court, LAW FORWARD 
(Sept. 14, 2010, 4:54 PM), http://lawforward.legalzoom.com/competition/no-in-house-counsel-
privilege-in-europe-eu-high-court/. 
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other laws because investigations and enforcement will likely be more 
frequent and the Commission will act with confidence of the outcome. 
Furthermore, one could say that there should not be a problem with 
viewing a company’s documents if the company is observing the law. A 
stronger privilege would give cartels more opportunities to avoid 
consequences while hiding behind the protection of confidentiality.  
 Furthermore, it can be said that arguments against Akzo are 
overstated because, in reality, Akzo changes nothing. In-house attorneys 
in EU member states did not have privilege in Commission competition 
investigations since AM & S Europe. The ECJ is not taking anything 
away from in-house attorneys because they did not have the privilege 
before the Akzo decision. All of the dire consequences that will 
supposedly result from this decision might not even happen if they have 
not already.  
 V.    SHOULD THE ECJ HAVE EXTENDED PRIVILEGE OR SHOULD IT IN 
THE FUTURE? 
 The EU is faced with the dilemma of balancing the need for in-house 
counsel’s freedom to communicate and the need to allow EU 
investigators the ability to conduct thorough investigations. A U.S. court 
concisely explained why the United States has adopted privilege: “The 
privilege’s central concern, and its ultimate justification, is to encourage 
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and 
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the 
administration of justice.”55 While there are clear benefits of having the 
privilege, the government also needs to have evidence in order to punish 
illegal activity. This is especially true in cases of potential competition 
law violations, where evidence is often scarce. The EU recognizes this: 
outside lawyers and their clients already enjoy the benefits of privilege. 
The main issue is whether it should extend to in-house counsel.  
 This decision comes down to what the EU values more—
confidentiality and the ability of attorneys to advocate without hesitation 
or the ability to sufficiently enforce competition law. The ECJ published 
their preference in Akzo: enforcement of competition law is paramount. 
Because this is important to the functioning of the EU and the welfare of 
companies and consumers, it is hard to dispute. As a result, clients of in-
house attorneys will suffer. While the ECJ did not decide so, it is 
possible to find a compromise that will extend privilege to in-house 
attorneys while also allowing the Commission to discover documents 
that show illegal intent or behavior.  
 A middle-road approach better balances the competing interests at 
issue, and the extremes of absolute rejection and absolute adoption of the 
privilege for in-house counsel are not desirable. A complete privilege 
                                                     
55 In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. 407, 414 (Ill. 2006) (quoting Upjohn v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). 
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would bar the Commission from using any attorney-client 
communication, a primary source of evidence in competition 
investigations. On the other hand, having no privilege would also be 
undesirable because companies need to have assurance that they can 
keep communications with their in-house attorneys confidential in order 
to do business. Using a system similar to the U.S. system would answer 
all of these concerns: privilege exists for all attorneys—outside or in-
house—in their communications with clients, but “does not extend to 
communications ‘made for the purpose of getting advice for the 
commission of a fraud’ or crime.”56 With a “crime-fraud exception,” as it 
is called in the United States, for in-house attorney-client 
communication, the supposed lack of independence would not matter 
because the Commission could discover the communications. Any 
motive that an in-house counsel—or outside attorney—might have to 
conceal the client’s illegal behavior would be countered by the threat that 
those communications may not be protected by privilege. The U.S. 
crime-fraud exception has another benefit: an independent judiciary 
should decide whether a document is privileged.
57
 U.S. District Courts 
have discretion to determine whether a document is a part of the crime-
fraud exception or if privilege protects it.
58
  
 While the U.S. system does not always provide the best solution for 
competition enforcement, the crime-fraud exception offers a solution that 
gives both sides the most they can get out of a difficult situation where 
compromise is necessary. The Commission can get documents that show 
illegal intent, and the attorneys can rest assured that courts will protect 
legal behavior. Courts will not protect documents that show intent to do 
illegal behavior; No attorney can legitimately claim otherwise. This 
exception might even benefit the EU because attorneys aiding companies 
in illicit competition will feel more confident expressing opinions. This 
might lead to a slip up that the Commission can later discover due to a 
manifestation of intent to carry out illegal behavior. With no privilege, 
attorneys and clients in in-house settings will write significantly less, and 
exchange fewer e-mails, which will make the Commission’s job of 
finding evidence of cartels and other competition law violations 
extremely difficult.  
 One might legitimately ask whether privilege for in-house counsel 
should depend on whether the attorney is a member of the national bar. 
Dependence on national bars would create several difficulties for the EU 
and member states. This issue arose in Akzo, as the appellants claimed 
that the Dutch attorney in question had a duty to stay independent based 
on his membership in the Netherlands’ bar.59 With a union of twenty-
                                                     
56 United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989) (quoting O’Rourke v. Darbishire, 1920 A. 
C. 581, 604 (P.C.)).  
57 See infra Part V (last few paragraphs) for more discussion on this topic and how it could be 
used to resolve future claims of privilege by companies facing European Commission investigations.  
58 In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. at 420.  
59 Case C-550/07, supra note 9, ¶ 36. 
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seven countries and without an EU bar association, it is difficult to base 
any EU rights or privileges on national bar association membership 
because there are differences between the laws and obligations governing 
attorneys in one member state of the EU as compared to another. 
Considering the frequency with which legal business and attorneys cross 
borders, especially in the common market of the EU (as seen in Akzo), 
any attempts to base privilege on membership of a national bar would 
become quite confusing. Furthermore, because some countries have 
established a national bar where privilege for in-house counsel does 
exist, these attorneys would become very desirable for companies across 
the EU because they could then rely on privilege. Also the member states 
that allow privilege would likely be flooded with applications to join 
their national bar. 
 In addition, to allow privilege to be determined based on national bar 
association membership might lead to discrimination in Commission 
competition investigations, which could violate the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Ever since the EU’s 
foundational treaty, the Treaty of Rome, a prohibition on discrimination 
on the basis of nationality has existed under Article 18 of the TFEU, 
which reads: “Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and 
without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.”60  
 Thus, allowing the Commission to discover documents from 
attorneys of one country who do not enjoy the benefits of privilege while 
not discovering the documents of attorneys from another country who do 
have privilege, though unintentional, would still be discriminatory. 
Discrimination under Article 18 need not be overt and intentional; it can 
be covert, and still illegal, as long as discrimination occurs.
61
 It is unclear 
if the EU would find that the Commission violated this article because 
the Commission could argue that it is just following member state bar 
regulations. Nevertheless, such an argument goes against basing 
privilege on membership in a national bar association. Further, basing 
privilege on nationality could also create problems with the TFEU’s 
provisions regarding the free movement of workers
62




 However, to require that an in-house attorney be a member of the 
national bar of any EU member state—not just one specifically—would 
not constitute discrimination under the TFEU because nothing prevents 
the EU from treating non-EU nationals differently than EU nationals. 
The issue of membership in a national bar is a concern of many in-house 
attorneys in the United States regarding their work in the EU because 
they find no protection for their communications with EU companies in 
                                                     
60 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 18, Dec. 13, 2007, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 01 
[hereinafter TFEU]. 
61 See, e.g., Case C224/00 Comm’n v. Italy, 2002 E.C.R. I-2965, ¶ 15.  
62 TFEU, supra note 60, art. 45. 
63 Id. art. 56. 
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the text of Akzo.
64
 However, nothing compels the EU to extend privilege 
to non-EU nationals and that is not likely to change. A policy based on 
the U.S. crime-fraud exception, where all EU member-state attorneys 
enjoy privilege with their clients except in situations of illegality or 
fraud, would not violate the TFEU articles. 
  Another aspect of Akzo that the EU should fix in regards to 
Commission competition investigations is the authority that the 
Commission has to determine whether documents are privileged. One of 
the more troubling aspects of Akzo is that the Commission took upon 
itself the decision of whether privilege applied to the documents in 
question. When Akzo/Akcros objected, the Commission essentially 
threatened Akzo/Akcros with an obstruction of investigation claim if 
they did not allow the investigators to examine the documents.
65
 The 
parties agreed that an Akzo/Akcros representative could watch while the 
investigator looked at the documents to determine whether privilege 
applied to the documents.
66
 Because the Commission is acting for the EU 
government it surely has interests and motives that bring into question its 
ability to impartially judge whether it can take documents. The 
Commission wants as much evidence as it can find and likely cannot 
judge independently whether documents are privileged. However, the 
ECJ has said that the Commission can decide whether or not privilege 
applies to a document because it has the power to take any documents 
related to the investigation.
67
  Although its ruling upheld the 
Commission’s decision, the General Court took issue with the 
Commission’s infringements into the realm of privilege. In somewhat 
strong language, the General Court condemned the Commission’s 
behavior by considering its decision to read the documents as a breach of 
the principle of privilege.
68
 Not only was this contrary to the “proper 
administration of justice,” but it also may have irreparably harmed the 
rights of those involved in the investigation.
69
 Such harm is likely to be 
inflicted because if privilege applied to the documents the Commission 
looked at, the documents likely contained information that the 
Commission should not have seen.
70
 Whether the information is 
protected would not matter; someone from the Commission would still 
know what the document says based on his or her reading of it to 
determine its status. He or she could use that information to obtain other 




 When the Commission does not know if a document is protected by 
privilege, it “must not read the contents of the document before it has 
                                                     
64 See, e.g., Bryan Cave, supra note 47. 
65 Case C-550/07, supra note 9, ¶ 3. 
66 Id. 
67 Case 155/79, supra note 8, ¶ 17. 
68 Case T-125/03, supra note 10, ¶ 86. 
69 Id. ¶ 87. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
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adopted a decision allowing the undertaking concerned to refer the 
matter to the Court of First Instance [now the General Court], and, if 
appropriate, to make an application for interim relief.”72 The General 
Court proposed a sound alternative: an independent judiciary rather than 
one of the parties to the investigation—like the Commission—should 
decide whether a document is privileged.
73
 The Commission would 
likely balk at the idea of letting the companies determine whether a 
document is privileged; likewise it should not be opposed to ceding this 
power to an independent court. The General Court would be in an 
excellent position to independently judge whether documents are 
privileged.  
VI.     CONCLUSION 
 Privilege is a vital part of the attorney-client relationship, and the 
ECJ should have extended it to in-house attorneys in the Akzo decision. 
While the ECJ may have been right in Akzo to follow precedent, the 
precedent—AM & S Europe—seems to be outdated and unreliable for 
resolving such a complicated issue in the twenty-first century. While the 
policy arguments in favor of extending privilege are clear, the opposing 
arguments are also strong: privilege should not be a shield to protect 
illegal behavior. This is especially true with cartels and other competition 
law violations, which would thrive on the secrecy and confidentiality that 
a privilege would provide.  
 The ECJ did not find a balance between these competing interests in 
Akzo. Instead, it favored the Commission and its ability to enforce EU 
law, a worthy pursuit. However, Akzo does not give attention to the 
reality that privilege does not need to be, and probably should not be, an 
unlimited right. It can be restricted to prevent abuse. Yet privilege should 
not be restricted to the point of preventing an entire group of attorneys—
in-house counsel—from enjoying vital protections based on the 
misperception that they cannot offer independent advice. A proper 
balance, such as a policy modeled after the U.S. crime-fraud exception, 
would fit the purposes of both sides of the debate. When the issue arises 
again before the ECJ, it should consider this balance and the benefits of 
extending privilege—though not unlimited—to in-house attorneys.
                                                     
72 Id. ¶ 85. 
73 Id. ¶ 67.  
 
